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Abstract. Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which
every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models un-
certainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating
together.
In this paper we study convexity, core and the Shapley value of games
with interval uncertainty.
Our motivation to do so is twofold. First, we want to capture which prop-
erties are preserved when we generalize concepts from classical coopera-
tive game theory to interval games. Second, since these generalizations
can be done in different ways, mainly with regard to the resulting level
of uncertainty, we try to compare them and show their relation to each
other.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty and inaccurate data are an everyday issue in real-world situations.
Therefore it is important to be able to make decisions even when the exact data
are not available and only bounds on them are known.
In classical cooperative game theory, every group of players (coalition) knows
the precise reward for their cooperation; in cooperative interval games, only the
worst and the best possible outcome is known. Such situations can be naturally
modeled with intervals encapsulating these outcomes.
Cooperative games under interval uncertainty were first considered by Branzei,
Dimitrov and Tijs in 2003 to study bankruptcy situations [11] and later further
extensively studied by Alparslan Go¨k in her PhD thesis [1] and in follow-up
papers (see the references section of [10] ).
We note that there are several other models incorporating a different level
of uncertainty, namely fuzzy cooperative games, multichoice games, crisp games
(see [12] for more), or games under bubbly uncertainty [20].
There are several reasons why it is interesting to study cooperative interval
game. From the aforementioned models of cooperative games, it is a quite simple
model but it is easier to analyze and it is suitable for situations where we do not
have any other assumptions on data we get. There are already a few applications
of this model, namely on forest situations [5], airport problems [4], bankruptcy
[11] or network design [15].
We continue in the line of research started in [8] (there is also an updated
version on arXiv [9]). We focus on selections, that is on possible outcomes of
interval games.
Our results. Here is a summary of our results and also how our paper is
organized.
• Section 3 is about convexity in interval games. We characterize selection
convex interval games in a style of Shapley [26].
• Section 4 investigates a problem of core coincidence, i.e. when the two dif-
ferent versions of generalized core for interval games coincide. We partially
solve this problem.
• Section 5 is about the Shapley value for interval games. We present a different
axiomatization of the interval Shapley extension than the one by [17] and
also show some important properties of this function.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classical cooperative games
Comprehensive sources on classical cooperative game theory are for example
[12,14,16,22]. For more on applications, see e.g. [7,13,18]. Here we present only
the necessary background theory for studying interval games. We examine only
the games with transferable utility (TU) and therefore by a cooperative game
or a game we mean a cooperative TU game.
Definition 1. (Cooperative game) A cooperative game is an ordered pair (N, v),
where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic
function of the cooperative game. We further assume that v(∅) = 0.
The set of all cooperative games with a player set N is denoted by GN .
Subsets of N are called coalitions and N itself is called the grand coalition.
We often write v instead of (N, v) because we can identify a game with its
characteristic function.
Solution concepts. To further analyze players’ gains, we need a payoff vector
which can be interpreted as a proposed distribution of rewards between players.
Definition 2. (Payoff vector) A payoff vector for a cooperative game (N, v) is
a vector x ∈ RN with xi being a reward given to the ith player.
Definition 3. (Imputation) An imputation of (N, v) ∈ GN is a vector x ∈ RN
such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for every i ∈ N .
The set of all imputations of a given game (N, v) is denoted by I(v).
Definition 4. (Core) The core of (N, v) ∈ GN is the set
C(v) =
{
x ∈ I(v);
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N
}
.
The last solution concept we will write about is the Shapley value. It was
introduced by Lloyd Shapely in 1952 [25]. It has many interesting properties;
namely, it is a one-point solution concept, it always exists and it can be axiom-
atized by very natural axioms. We refer to [22] for a survey of results on the
Shapley value.
Theorem 1. (Shapley, 1952, [26]) There exists a unique function f : GN → RN ,
satisfying the following properties for every (N, v) ∈ GN .
• (Efficiency) It holds that
∑
i∈N fi(v) = v(N).
• (Dummy player) It holds fi(v) = 0 for every i ∈ N , such that for every
S \ {i} ⊆ N , equality v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) holds.
• (Symmetry) If for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = v(S ∪ j)− v(S)
holds, then fi(v) = fj(v).
• (Additivity) For every two games u, v ∈ GN , fi(u+ v) = fi(u)+ fi(v) holds.
This unique function is called the Shapley value (φ) and it is defined as
φi(v) :=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ i)− v(S)).
Classes. There are many important classes of cooperative games. Here we
show the most important ones.
Definition 5. (Monotonic game) A game (N, v) is monotonic if for every T ⊆
S ⊆ N we have
v(T ) ≤ v(S).
Informally, in monotonic games, bigger coalitions are stronger.
Another important type of game is a convex game.
Definition 6. (Convex game) A game (N, v) is convex if its characteristic func-
tion is supermodular. The characteristic function is supermodular if for every
S ⊆ T ⊆ N ,
v(T ) + v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Clearly, supermodularity implies superadditivity. The class of convex games
is maybe the most prominent class, it has many applications and theoretical
properties. We present the most important one for this paper.
Theorem 2. (Shapley, 1971, [26]) Every convex game has a nonempty core.
2.2 Interval analysis
Definition 7. (Interval) An interval X is a set
X := [X,X] = {x ∈ R : X ≤ x ≤ X}.
with X being the lower bound and X being the upper bound of the interval. The
length of an interval X is defined as |X | := |X −X|.
From now on, by an interval we mean a closed interval. The set of all real
closed intervals is denoted by IR.
The following definition (from [19]) shows how to do basic arithmetics with
intervals.
Definition 8. (Interval arithmetics) For every X,Y, Z ∈ IR, and 0 /∈ Z, define
X + Y := [X + Y ,X + Y ],
X ⊖ Y := [X − Y ,X − Y ],
X · Y := [minS,maxS], S = {XY ,XY ,XY ,XY }, and
X /Z := [minS,maxS], S = {X/Z,X/Z,X/Z,X/Z}.
For our purpose, we need to have a slightly different definition of subtrac-
tion. The aforementioned subtraction operator is known as Moore’s subtraction
operator.
Definition 9. (Partial subtraction operator) For every I, J ∈ IR, such that
I − J ≤ I − J , define
I − J := [I − J, I − J ].
In other words, the length of the subtracted interval has to be lesser or equal
to the length of the interval we subtract from.
Example 1. Take two intervals [1, 4] and [3, 5]. Then [1, 4] − [3, 5] = [−2,−1].
Notice, however, that [3, 5]− [1, 4] is undefined.
We note that this notation is not common in interval analysis. The minus
sign is used for Moore’s subtraction operator there. Also, in our previous paper
[8,9] we used minus sign for Moore’s subtraction.
Alparslan Go¨k [1] choose to compare intervals in the following way, using the
weakly better operator. That was inspired by Hinojosa et al. [24].
Definition 10. (Weakly better operator ) An interval I is weakly better than
interval J (I  J) if I ≥ J and I ≥ J . Interval I is better than J (I ≻ J) if
and only if I  J and I 6= J .
Naturally, we also use A ≺ B and C  D for B ≻ A and D  C, respectively.
2.3 Cooperative interval games
Now we review basics of cooperative games with interval uncertainty. The fol-
lowing is the main definition of this paper.
Definition 11. (Cooperative interval game) A cooperative interval game is an
ordered pair (N,w), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of players and w : 2N → IR
is the characteristic function of the cooperative game. We further assume that
w(∅) = [0, 0]. The set of all interval cooperative games on a player set N is
denoted by IGN .
Note 1. We often write w(i) instead of w({i}) and w(i, j) instead of w({i, j}).
Note 2. Every cooperative interval game in which its characteristic function
maps to degenerate intervals only can be associated with a classical coopera-
tive game. The converse holds as well.
Definition 12. (Border games) For every (N,w) ∈ IGN , border games (N,w) ∈
GN (lower border game) and (N,w) ∈ GN (upper border game) are given by
w(S) := w(S) and w(S) := w(S) for every S ∈ 2N .
Definition 13. (Length game) The length game of (N,w) ∈ IGN is the game
(N, |w|) ∈ GN with
|w|(S) := w(S)− w(S), ∀S ∈ 2N .
Definition 14. (Degenerated game)We call a game (N,w) ∈ IGN degenerated
if its length game is everywhere zero, that is, |w|(S) = 0 for every S ∈ 2N . A
non-degenerated game is a game which is not degenerated.
The basic notion of our approach will be a selection and consequently a
selection imputation and a selection core.
Definition 15. (Selection) A game (N, v) ∈ GN is a selection of (N,w) ∈ IGN
if for every S ∈ 2N we have v(S) ∈ w(S). The set of all selections of (N,w) is
denoted by Sel(w).
Note that border games are examples of selections and also of degenerated
games.
Solution concepts. There are many possibilities how to define imputations
and core for interval games. We present the following two. The first one is based
on selections, the second one on the weakly better operator.
Definition 16. The set of interval selection imputations (or just selection im-
putations) of (N,w) ∈ IGN is defined as
SI(w) =
⋃{
I(v) | v ∈ Sel(w)
}
.
Definition 17. The interval selection core (or just selection core) of (N,w) ∈
IGN is defined as
SC(w) =
⋃{
C(v) | v ∈ Sel(w)
}
.
In an analogous way as in classical games, we have a term for games with
nonempty selection core for all selections.
Definition 18. [3] An interval game is called strongly balanced if every selec-
tion of this game has a nonempty core. The set of all strongly balanced games
on a player set N is denoted by BIGN .
Definition 19. The set of interval imputations of (N,w) ∈ IGN is defined as
I(w) :=
{
(I1, I2, . . . , IN ) ∈ IR
N |
∑
i∈N
Ii = w(N), Ii  w(i), ∀i ∈ N
}
.
Definition 20. The interval core of (N,w) ∈ IGN is defined as
C(w) :=
{
(I1, I2, . . . , IN ) ∈ I(w) |
∑
i∈S
Ii  w(S), ∀S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}
}
.
An important difference between the definitions of interval and selection core
and imputation is that selection concepts yield payoff vectors from RN , while
I and C yield vectors from IRN . Thus they both possess a different degree of
uncertainty.
Classes of interval games.
Definition 21. (Size monotonic interval game) A game (N,w) ∈ IGN is size
monotonic if for every T ⊆ S ⊆ N we have
|w|(T ) ≤ |w|(S).
That is, its length game is monotonic. The class of size monotonic games on a
player set N is denoted by SMIGN .
As we can see, size monotonic games capture situations in which an interval
uncertainty grows with the size of a coalition.
We should be careful with the following analogy of a convex game since unlike
for classical games, supermodularity is not the same as convexity.
Definition 22. (Supermodular interval game) An interval game (N,w) is su-
permodular interval if for every S ⊆ T ⊆ N holds
w(T ) + v(S)  w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ).
We get immediately that an interval game is supermodular interval if and
only if its border games are convex.
Definition 23. (Convex interval game) An interval game (N,w) is convex in-
terval if its border games and length game are convex. We write CIGN for a set
of convex interval games on a player set N .
A convex interval game is supermodular as well but the converse does not hold
in general. See [2] for characterizations of convex interval games and discussion
of their properties.
Finally, we define selection based classes of interval games. The paper [8]
discusses their properties and relations with the previous classes.
Definition 24. (Selection monotonic interval game) An interval game (N, v) is
selection monotonic if all its selections are monotonic games. The class of such
games on a player set N is denoted by SeMIGN .
Definition 25. (Selection convex interval game) An interval game (N, v) is
selection convex if all its selections are convex games. The class of such games
on a player set N is denoted by SeCIGN .
2.4 Notation
We will use ≤ relation on real vectors. For every x, y ∈ RN we write x ≤ y if
xi ≤ yi holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
We do not use symbol ⊂ in this paper. Instead, ⊆ and ( are used for the
subset and the proper subset relation, respectively, to avoid ambiguity.
We also use x(S) instead of
∑
i∈S xi occasionally.
Throughout the papers on cooperative interval games, notation, especially
of core and imputations, is not unified. It is, therefore, possible to encounter
different notation from ours. Also, in some papers the selection core is called the
core of interval game. We consider that confusing and that is why we use the
term selection core instead. The term selection imputation is then used because
of its connection with the selection core.
3 Convexity
We present a characterization of the interval games in the class SeCIG, analogous
to a classical result of Shapley on convex games [26] and to Theorem 3.1 on
convex interval games in [2].
Theorem 3. For every interval game (N,w), the following assertions are equiv-
alent.
1. The game (N,w) is a selection convex interval game.
2. For every nonempty S, T ∈ 2N , such that S ∩ T 6= T , and S ∩ T 6= S,
w(S) + w(T ) ≤ w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ).
3. For every coalition U1, U2, U ∈ 2N , such that U1 ( U2 ⊆ N \ U , and U is
nonempty,
w(U1 ∪ U)− w(U1) ≤ w(U2 ∪ U)− w(U2).
4. For every coalition T1, T2 ∈ 2N , and for every i ∈ N , such that T1 ( T2 ⊆
N \ {i},
w(T1 ∪ {i})− w(T1) ≤ w(T2 ∪ {i})− w(T2).
Proof.
(1)↔ (2) : This proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in [9].
(2) → (3) : Suppose for a contradiction that there exist U1, U2, U ∈ 2N , U
nonempty, such that U1 ( U2 ⊆ N \ U , and
w(U1 ∪ U)− w(U1) > w(U2 ∪ U)− w(U2).
Define S := U1 ∪U , and T := U2. Both S and T are nonempty sets and they
are incomparable. Furthermore:
w(U1 ∪ U)− w(U1) > w(U2 ∪ U)− w(U2),
w(S)− w(U1) > w(T ∪ U)− w(T ),
w(S) + w(T ) > w(T ∪ U) + w(U1),
w(S) + w(T ) > w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ).
And we obtained a contradiction.
(3)→ (4) : Straightforward; take U1 := T1, U2 := T2, U := {i}.
(4) → (3) : Suppose that (4) holds and (3) does not. Take U that violates
(3) of minimal cardinality. If |U | = 1, we get a contradiction. If |U | > 1, we
can construct U ′, with |U ′| = |U | − 1, such that it violates (3) as well. This
contradicts the minimality of U .
(3) → (2) : For a contradiction, take S and T which violate (2). Define
U := S\T ; this must be nonempty since S and T are nonempty and incomparable.
Define U1 := S ∩ T and U2 := T . As for the conditions on U1 and U2, we see
that U1 ( U2, since U is nonempty and (S ∩ T ) ⊆ T . Now:
w(S ∪ U)− w(T ) > w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T )
w(U1 ∪ U) + w(T ) > w(U1 ∪ U ∪ T ) + w(U1)
w(U1 ∪ U)− w(U1) > w(U2 ∪ U)− w(U2)
A contradiction. ⊓⊔
4 Core coincidence
In Alparslan-Go¨k’s PhD thesis [1] and in paper [6], the following question is
suggested:
“A difficult topic might be to analyze under which conditions the set
of payoff vectors generated by the interval core of a cooperative interval
game coincides with the core of the game in terms of selections of the
interval game.”
The main thing to notice is that while the interval core gives us a set of
interval vectors, selection core gives us a set of real numbered vectors. To be
able to compare them, we need to assign to a set of interval vectors a set of real
vectors generated by these interval vectors. That is exactly what the following
function gen does.
Definition 26. The function gen : 2IR
N
→ 2R
N
maps to every set of interval
vectors a set of its selections. It is defined as
gen(S) =
⋃
s∈S
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | xi ∈ si
}
.
The core coincidence problem can be formulated in the following way.
Problem 1. (Core coincidence problem) What are the necessary and sufficient
conditions so that an interval game satisfies gen(C(w)) = SC(w)?
To avoid a cumbersome notation we define the following property.
Definition 27. Let (N,w) be a cooperative interval game. We call the game
core-coincident if gen(C(w)) = SC(w). Also, we say that a set of interval games
is core-coincident if all games in this set are core-coincident.
Our results in this section are an important step towards a complete classi-
fication of core-coincident games.
4.1 Positive results
Proposition 1. Every cooperative interval game with empty selection core is
core-coincident.
Proof. This easily follows from [8, Theorem 7]. ⊓⊔
Proposition 2. Every degenerated cooperative interval game is core-coincident.
Proof. It is easy to check that definitions of selection core (Definition 17) and
interval core (Definition 20) coincide for degenerate games. ⊓⊔
We present the following example, showing there exist infinitely many core-
coincident non-degenerated games with a nonempty player set. But first, we need
one more result.
Theorem 4. (Core coincidence technical lemma, [9]) For every interval game
(N,w) we have gen(C(w)) = SC(w), if and only if for every x ∈ SC(w), there
exist nonnegative vectors l(x) and u(x), such that
x(N)− l(x)(N) = w(N), (1)
x(N) + u(x)(N) = w(N), (2)
x(S)− l(x)(S) ≥ w(S), ∀S ∈ 2N , (3)
x(S) + u(x)(S) ≥ w(S), ∀S ∈ 2N . (4)
Theorem 5. There are infinitely many non-degenerated core-coincident interval
games.
Proof. Define a game (N,wA), wA(S) := 1/|S|, if S 6= N , and further wA(N) :=
[|N |, |N |+ b], b > 0, b ∈ R.
Clearly, C(wA) consists exactly of vectors x, such that x(N) ∈ wA(N), and
xi ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ N .
Take any such vector x. Define l
(x)
i
:= x(i)− 1, and u
(x)
1 := x(1) + wA(N)−
x(N), and u
(x)
i := x(i), for every i ∈ N, i 6= 1. It is now straightforward to
check that all inequalities of Theorem 4 hold and, therefore, this game is core-
coincident. ⊓⊔
4.2 Negative results
Theorem 6. Let (N,w) be an interval game such that:
• a game (N, u), defined by
u(S) :=
{
w(S) if S = N,
w(S) if S 6= N,
has a nonempty core, and
• C(w) 6= ∅.
Then (N,w) is not core-coincident.
Proof. We define an excess function as e(x, S) := x(S)− w(S).
If for every x ∈ C(u), and every player i ∈ N , there is a coalition S ∈
2N \ N, i ∈ S, such that e(x, S) = 0, then we claim that the core of the upper
border game w of w is empty.
To see this, observe that C(w) ⊆ C(u). But, if every x ∈ C(u) has the
aforementioned property then, by Theorem 4 none of those x can be in C(w); a
contradiction with C(w) 6= ∅.
So the other option is that there exists a vector y ∈ C(u), and a player j ∈ N ,
such that for every S ∈ 2N \N, j ∈ S, e(x, S) > 0. We define
m := min
S∈2N\N,j∈S
e(x, S),
and M the set on which this minimum is attained. We pick an arbitrary player
j′ ∈ N \M . Such player must exist. Then we construct a new vector y′:
y′k :=


yk −m if k = j,
yk +m if k = j
′,
yk else.
It can be checked that y′ ∈ C(u) and by a similar argument as in the previous
case, y′ does not satisfy the mixed system of inequalities in Theorem 4 and we
are done. ⊓⊔
This theorem has several important corollaries.
Corollary 1. Every interval game (N,w) ∈ BIGN with |w|(S) > 0 for every
S ∈ 2N , is not core-coincident.
Corollary 2. Classes SeCIGN and CIGN are not core-coincident for |N | > 1.
Furthermore, every game in SeCIGN∪CIGN with every interval non-degenerated
and |N | > 1 is not core-coincident.
Proof. Theorem 2 implies that selection convex games are totally balanced. In
[2], it is proved that a game is convex interval game if and only if its lower border
game and its length game are convex. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Observe that SeCIGN ⊆ SeSIGN ⊆ SeMIGN , so we immediately obtain
that all these sets are not core-coincident as well for nontrivial player sets. Also,
CIGN ⊆ SIGN , so superadditive interval games are not core-coincident either.
From this we conclude that selection core and interval core behave differently
on many important and widely used classes with nontrivial uncertainty. There-
fore, to further develop theory and solve problems regarding both versions of
cores of interval games is an important task.
5 The Shapley value
Preliminaries and definitions. Before we list the axioms we need in this
section, a few definitions are needed.
Every function f : IGN → IRN is called interval value function. We omit
interval when context is clear.
• Two intervals I, J are said to be indifferent if I+I2 =
J+J
2 . We denote it by
I ∼ J .
• Let (N,w) ∈ IGN and i ∈ N . Then, i is called a null player in w if w(S) =
w(S ∪ i) for every S ⊆ N \ {i}.
• Let (N,w) ∈ IGN and i ∈ N . Then, i is called a total null player in w if
w(S)⊖w(S ∪ i) = [0, 0] for every S ⊆ N \ {i}. In other words, i is total null
player if it is a dummy player in every selection.
• Let (N,w) ∈ IGN and i, j ∈ N . Then, i and j are symmetric players in
(N,w), if w(S ∪ i) = w(S ∪ j) for every S ⊆ N{i, j}.
We can state a few axioms.
1. Indifference efficiency (IEFF):
∑
i∈N Ψi(w) ∼ w(N) for all (N,w) ∈ IG
N .
2. Efficiency (EFF):
∑
i∈N Ψi(w) = w(N) for all (N,w) ∈ IG
N .
3. Indifference null player property (INP): There exists a unique t ≥ 0 such
that Ψi(w) = [−t, t] for any (N,w) ∈ IGN and all null players i in (N,w).
4. Total null player property (TNP): For every total null player i in a game
(N,w), Ψi(w) = [0, 0].
5. Symmetry (SYM): Ψi(w) = Ψj(w) for all (N,w) ∈ IGN and all symmetric
players i and j in (N,w).
6. Additivity (ADD): Ψ(v + w) = Ψ(v) + Ψ(w) for all (N, v), (N,w) ∈ IGN
with (N, v + w) ∈ IGN .
Definition 28. The interval Shapley value extension is a value function Φ∗ :
IGN → IRN ,
Φ∗i (w) :=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(w(S ∪ i)⊖ w(S)).
Theorem 7. [17] The function Φ∗ satisfies axioms IEFF, INP, SYM, and ADD.
Furthermore, it is the only function satisfying these axioms.
We now prove an important, yet never noted and proved property of the
interval Shapley value extension.
Theorem 8. For every interval game (N,w) ∈ IGN , we have
Φ∗i (w) =
{
φi(v) | v ∈ Sel(w)
}
.
Proof. Every resulting value from Φ∗i (w) corresponds to some selection of w
by Definition 28 and interval arithmetics, more precisely because of Moore’s
subtraction (Definition 8). The converse holds as well. ⊓⊔
In other words, the interval Shapley value extension contains exactly all pos-
sible Shapley values that can be attained when uncertainty is settled. We find
this property very important.
However, as is noted in [17], efficiency is not always satisfied. Let us explain
this issue. From properties of interval arithmetics, we see that X − X is not
equal to [0, 0] in general for X ∈ IR. In fact, for every interval A,B ∈ IR,
|A + B| ≥ min{|A|, |B|}. An analogous fact holds for Moore’s subtraction as
well. Since, by definition of the interval Shapley value extension, in
∑
i∈N Φ
∗
i (w)
are some intervals added and subtracted multiple times, the resulting value does
not satisfy efficiency if we first compute Φ∗i (w) for every i, and only then add
them together. This is the reason why EFF is not satisfied in general. We can
first simplify
∑
i∈N Φ
∗
i (w) and only then add it together. Then we would get
the efficiency by the same reasoning as we get efficiency for the Shapley value in
classical games.
Another axiomatization. The following theorem shows a different axiom-
atization of the interval Shapley value extension than [17]. We show that the
axiom TNP can be interchanged with the axiom INP, which is, from our point
of view, more natural.
Theorem 9. There is a unique value function satisfying axioms IEFF, TNP,
SYM and ADD. Furthermore, it equals Φ∗.
Proof. If a value function satisfies IEFF, INP, SYM, and ADD, then it is equal
to Φ∗. From its formula, we conclude that TNP is satisfied.
Now in the other direction, if a value function satisfies IEFF, TNP, SYM and
ADD we want to show that it satisfies INP as well.
Our goal is to prove that in every game (N ′, w′) with a null player h, φ∗∗h (w
′)
is an interval symmetric around zero.
It suffices to prove that:
• If k ∈ Φ∗∗h (w
′), then −k ∈ Φ∗∗h (w
′), and
• if a < b, and a, b ∈ Φ∗∗h (w
′), then [a, b] ⊆ Φ∗∗h (w
′).
Both of these claims can be proved by using ADD axiom and the fact, that on
degenerated game, Φ∗∗ coincides with φ. We omit technical details here.
We know that every null player gets a symmetrical interval under a value
function φ∗∗ satisfying IEFF, TNP, SYM and ADD. So the only remaining op-
tion is that there must exist a game in which two null players get a different
symmetrical interval. Let us denote such game as (N ′′, w′′) and the two null
players as i and j.
Observe from the definition of null player that
w′′(S ∪ i) = w′′(S)
holds for every S ⊆ N\{i}, and thus, specially, for every S ⊆ N\{i, j}. Following
the same reasoning, we arrive on conclusion that
w′′(S ∪ j) = w′′(S)
holds for every S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Combining this, we get that
w′′(S ∪ j) = w′′(S) = w′′(S ∪ i), ∀S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
That means that i and j are symmetrical and from the axiom SYM, φ∗∗i (w
′′)
should be equal to φ∗∗j (w
′′), a contradiction.
Finally, we note that the independence of properties IEFF, TNP, SYM, and
ADD follows from Theorem 7 and from [23]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 10. For every (N,w) ∈ SeCIG, we have gen(Φ∗(w)) ⊆ SC(w).
Proof. From Theorem 8, the Shapley value of every selection is in gen(Φ∗(w)).
Since every selection of (N,w) is a convex game, its Shapley value lies in its core
and thus also in SC(w). ⊓⊔
On the improved interval Shapley-like value. In Han et al. [17], an im-
proved Shapley-like value satisfying EFF is presented.
Definition 29. (The improved interval Shapley-like value) For any (N,w) ∈
IGN with
∑
i∈N Φ
∗
i (w) 6= w(N), the improved interval Shapley like value IΦ
∗(w)
is defined by
IΦ∗i (w) := Φ
∗
i (wm) +
|Φ∗i (wu)|∑
i∈N |Φ
∗
i (wu)|
[
−
1
2
|w(N)|,
1
2
|v(N)|
]
,
where wm(S) := (w(S) + w(S))/2.
Theorem 11. For every interval game (N,w) ∈ IGN , we have
IΦ∗i (w) 6=
{
φi(v) | v ∈ Sel(w)
}
.
Proof. We use Theorem 8 and Definition 28. ⊓⊔
We believe that this is a big downside of the improved interval Shapley-like
value. We borrow a game from [17] to illustrate the theorem.
Example 2. Let (N, v) be a three-person interval game where v(1) = [0, 2], v(2) =
[1/2, 3/2], v(3) = [1, 2], v(1, 2) = [2, 3], v(2, 3) = [4, 4], v(1, 3) = [3, 4], and v(1, 2, 3) =
[6, 7]. Then Φ∗(v) = ([11/12, 31/12], [7/6, 17/6], [23/12, 43/12]).However, IΦ∗(v) =
([19/12, 23/12], [11/6, 13/6], [31/12, 35/12]).
By Theorem 11, there must be a selection v′ of (N, v), such that φ1(v
′) =
11/12. But this value is not contained in IΦ∗1(v).
6 Conclusion and future research
We investigated convexity in interval games, core coincidence problem and in-
terval Shapley value. To this end, we would like to summarize our results.
• We showed a Shapley-like characterization of selection convex interval games
in Theorem 3.
• We tried to characterize all core-coincident games. Our main contribution is
Theorem 6, saying that a large class of interval games is not core-coincident.
This result implies that many classes, including CIGN , SeCIGN , and strongly
balanced games are not core-coincident.
• We analyzed interval Shapley value extension for interval games. We empha-
sized several facts which speak in favor of using this solution concept. Also,
we showed a different, from our point of view more natural axiomatization
of this value function in Theorem 9.
Apart from the open problems presented in the papers from the references
we think it could be interesting to define prekernel for interval games and ax-
iomatically characterize it, analogously to Peleg [21]. Also, interval games with
communication structures were not studied yet. See Bilbao’s book [7] for a the-
oretical background.
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